



# UX Rapid Discovery

**Killed by Social Media – Unban.Me**

*Understanding Bangladeshi Activists'  
Vulnerability on Facebook*

## Hague Peace Projects – Bangladeshi Workgroup

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# THE HAGUE PEACE PROJECTS

The Hague Peace Projects (HPP) is a young and dynamic peace organization based in The Hague, The Netherlands. Started by diaspora communities, the organization empowers people to reconstruct their motivation and skills to deal with conflicts peacefully, using a wide range of tools such as research, advocacy, education, cultural events, and media.

Beginning 2017, HPP hosted The Hague Hacks Festival, motivated by an urgent need to connect technology professionals, start-ups, and human rights defenders to explore and brainstorm possible technological solutions for human rights issues.

## The Hague Hacks – Bangladeshi Workgroup

On December 14<sup>th</sup>, 2018, HPP hosted the second annual The Hague Hacks Festival (HHF) focused on five human rights issues from five countries. Each human rights issue was unpacked, explored, and discussed in the context of a workshop. One of these workshops was the polarizing role of social media in Bangladesh in which Facebook has become a tool of violence and death to activists online. The outcome of the HHF includes launching a rapid user study before developing a tech solution and service prototype.

## UX Rapid Discovery Team

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[Melanie Tan Uy](#) has a Ph.D. in Anthropology from the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam. She works in the intersection of academia, technology, and industry. While she currently practices as a UX Researcher and Service Designer, these roles are insufficient to cover her broad interests and vocation as a breaker of knowledge silos that hinder organizations, groups, and individuals from expanding mindsets that impact the development of relevant, equitable, and sustainable solutions to human problems. Read more about her work and ideas here <http://melanietuy.mystrikingly.com/>

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## Key Summary

- Human rights activism and campaigns have been assimilated under surveillance and platform capitalism with private entity Facebook becoming the sole arbiter of communication among Bangladeshi activists.
- Given the closed algorithms, opaque, and unpredictable hierarchies of arbitration within Facebook, interventions are limited and remain band-aid situations even for tech experts.

## Proposed Solutions

- Short-term projects to assist Bangladeshi activists include centralizing information under The Hague Peace Projects banner with massive information campaigns that utilize top Google page sites such as Wikipedia and YouTube.
- Long-term projects target change within Facebook through evidence-based lobbying using big data sets that prove selective and deliberate harm for human rights defenders.
- Campaign for punitive sanctions for Facebook under the GDPR act remains a viable option to force attention on the matter.

## Strategic Highlights for The Hague Peace Projects (HPP)

- The Unban.me series of projects inform the brand identity of HPP when it comes to securing funding at the project-level. Some examples of brand identities include mediator between technology and human rights and data rights activism.
- The Unban.me series of projects align targets for project accomplishments of HPP as part of establishing itself as a reliable, trustworthy, and committed group.

## Looking Ahead

This short-term project is a springboard towards a long-term goal of evidence-based lobbying. This pilot study serves to refine questions for future collection of big data sets for analysis.

12 September 2019

# PROJECT BACKGROUND

Of the human rights issues prepared for The Hague Hacks Festival (HHF), two - the current polarizing role of social media in Bangladesh and the protection of personal data from the government of Pakistan - featured prominently in the debate. Under the theme “Killed By Social Media,” participants at the HHF discussed how to make tolerance and inclusiveness go “viral” in countries such as Bangladesh. A network of professionals had emerged, willing to collaborate with the Bangladesh workgroup of the Hague Peace Projects in bringing ideas discussed at the event to life. Specifically, the team decided to implement the project *unban.me* – a campaign focused on helping activists reclaim social media as a safe space by locating and operationalizing means to counter online harassment and prevent Facebook accounts from being banned.

The UX Rapid Discovery is based on a two-month discovery research conducted between February – May 2019. The purpose is three-fold:

- To identify the pain points of Bangladeshi activists on Facebook for suitable intervention and support
- To advocate for the activist perspective prior, during, and after the conceptualization and implementation of the tech solution
- To identify insights to help HPP distinguish their funding, branding, and projects campaigns

The study consists of in-depth, one to two-hour-long interviews with five Bangladeshi activists in the diaspora from various parts of the European Union. Specifically, the interviews focused on behaviour profile, including their activist identities, activities, and campaigns, as well as their posting behaviour online and the aftermaths of harassment and bans. The researchers ensured that the research design and process followed GDPR regulations of privacy, anonymity, and responsible use and storage. Any recording, except for text record which is kept for research purposes, will be removed from any storage system at the termination of the project. The activist partner can request at any time to have this data permanently removed. The names and gender pronouns have been concealed to protect their identity and anonymised. Nevertheless, their stories remain accurate.

The views in this report represent the Rapid Discovery Team of researchers and are in no way represent all the other groups and management of The Hague Peace Projects umbrella of teams and workgroups.

# Brief Background: Bangladesh

To understand the contemporary structural online violence for Bangladeshi activists require looking back to the history of Bangladesh partition from Pakistan in 1971. At that time, Bengali Muslims in present-day Bangladesh sought an Islamic identity that recognized its own diversity and hybrid nature incompatible in what they perceived under a neo-colonial rule from West Pakistan. The violent and bloody nature of partition led to the formulation of pro-secular democratic Muslim majority under the four principles of secularism, socialism, nationalism, and democracy led by two warring parties, the ruling party Awami League, now led by Sheikh Hasina, and the opposition party, Bangladesh National Party, currently led by Khaleda Zia. The current tinderbox political climate that also included military dictatorships that enacted an Islamist-based nationalism is what Islam (2018) calls as the unfinished revolution in which the discourse and interpretations of the four principles continue to be re-defined today within Bangladesh creating a risky environment for Hindu, moderate Islam, and secular minority communities.

## Shahbag Movement: The Turning Point for Cyber War & Offline Deaths

In 2009, the ruling Awami League set up an International Criminal Tribunal (ICT) to prosecute the war criminals of the 1971 partition. On February 5, 2013, the ICT found Abdul Quader Mollah, Assistant Secretary of the Jamaat-Islami Bangladesh (JIB) guilty for rape and involvement in the killing of hundreds of people and sentenced him to life imprisonment. This sentence mollified thousands of people that demanded the death penalty for him and 12 alleged war criminals and a ban on extremism in a protest rally at Shahbag, Dhaka. This movement primarily rooted in a secular humanist ideology was countered by the JIB among other parties that demanded the prosecution of Shahbag activists as enemies of Islam under the blasphemy laws. This ideological friction and JIB campaign for the deaths of atheist bloggers led to the hacking deaths of prominent Shahbag blogger, Ahmed Rajib Haider on February 15, 2013, and after ten days, critic and writer Avijit Roy. The terrorist attacks from numerous Islamist groups continued until 2016 and saw the attack of 29 people and hacking of gay rights activist Xulhaz Mannan. Numerous lesser known activists have received consistent harassment from the state and extremists and have been driven out of Bangladesh for fear of their lives.

# ACTIVIST PROFILES

While quick stats provide you with some demographic information, this does not fully capture the dynamic quality of people's lives. As James Weiner (1993: 288) challenges those in anthropology or the social sciences, our task is to examine the *conditions* by which people perceive to be relationally based. In doing so, we can begin to explore the context by which activists choose to disassociate and how they do it. A behavior profile presents a movement at a given period in an activist timeline that is a snapshot of who they are.

Location. The activists marked their lives as pre-2013 Bangladesh and post-2016 Bangladesh when they began their exile in third countries.

Identity. Based on the timeline, activists described themselves as having their robust occupational and role identities - writer, journalist, student, mother, feminist transformed yet again once they moved to third countries. They need to re-imagine and re-configure their roles, whether as a student, academic, exile, or writer, in their new homes. It is currently a struggle and in-progress.

Activities. The activity level of the activists differs between the two periods. When they lived in Bangladesh, local community organizing was highly active along with their public participation in blogs and local news writing and dissemination. These activities change post-2016 when online social media campaigns increase while it was noticeable that their exile does not equate to an increase in engagement with Western media.

## QUICK STATS ON OUR PARTNERS

- Diaspora Bangladeshis living in the greater EU area
- Facebook is the platform of choice for online activism
- 25 - 50 years old
- 8,000 to 50,000 Facebook followers



## Insights

### Takeaways

Tech or behavioral interventions must be dynamic that reflect activist mobility.

Interventions need not be electronic or wholly technologically based.

Low-tech interventions include web-based information for migration to third countries and activities that connect activists to other local Western-based media and groups.

Any intervention for activists requires a perspective beyond binaries - whether in compiling activist profiles, locations, and activities. Activists view their life positions as dynamic and therefore, intervention and support must reflect the mobile identities and energetic movements of this group. The timeline serves as merely a snapshot of a time and place that allows us to peek into the challenges of designing an intervention.

Location & Identities. The choice for exile in third countries vary. In most cases, the selection is based on their future identities, such as becoming a “student” and enrolling in a university for two of our partners. One adult refugee is slowly adjusting to life and language in a northern country. This move requires activists to create new identities and struggle to include their activism in the local mainstream environment.

Activities. One of the drastic changes in an activist life is the level of their public visibility and campaign activities. Once close involvement in Bangladesh, these activities drastically reduce in the third countries. This reduction in offline real-life campaigns drives retention and dependence on Facebook as the only platform for activism abroad.



# ACTIVIST FACEBOOK USE

Facebook has become the platform monopoly of activism, especially for Bangladeshi activists. The reliance on technology platforms gave rise to what Srnicek (2017) calls as platform capitalism or more radically, surveillance capitalism by Zuboff (2019). Both point how free resources are extracted from users, including campaign activists, to monetize and secure their power in the market. This shift has made technology both as a problem and a solution.

Online Privacy Secondary. Our partners consider the human connection as their primary goal in their online activism, except for one who uses an anonymous identity online. Thus, their public and private selves are the same online and offline. While risky, this create wider readership and interaction, including with their opponents. The objective is to **humanize activism**.

Low-Level Self-Censorship. Our partners cultivate a specific persona on their posts. They focus on ideology-based posts that are factual and link to think pieces and maintain positive and motivational writing. The dark side is that this is low-level self-censorship online that has effectively muffled free writing and thinking. On the occasion that posts are reactive to specific real-time issues, the threat for Facebook bans and harassment from followers remain a high probability outcome.

The concept of privacy by activists follow the idea of social privacy rather than the technical data security framework traditionally understood (see Eghbal 2019).

## HUMANIZE ACTIVISM

“I am not a robot.”

Human connection, including their opponents trump identity privacy security concerns.

## SELF-CENSORSHIP

“My religion is love.”

Factual, positive, motivational, and careful crafting of online posts are the ideal contexts and abide by Facebook community standards. However, this is can also be a form of self-censorship on human communication that includes reactive and divisive opinions. The threat of online bans effectively promotes an ongoing low-level anxiety for activists.

## Takeaways

The advice of “just don’t use Facebook” is unhelpful for activists who rely on Facebook for their sustained campaigns.

Facebook is now a monopoly platform for activism. Thus, Facebook pose added risk for activists due to unpredictable and opaque practices of profile and posts takedowns especially under hostile government censors.

The self-censorship through the adherence to Facebook community standards by activists is already a success for extremists.

Facebook has become a monopoly for activism. Once an activity that was in the free public domain, activism has become entangled and dependent on private corporations. This dependency has resulted in high-risk consequences for users, especially activists.

Data security, particularly with identity protection, is elementary to minimal among average, non-technical savvy activists. Age group and gender are negligible among the group. The use of their real identities online increases their risk for sustained online harassment across all types of social media platforms that spill over to offline real-time violence.

To self-manage the perceived and actual daily threats, activists self-censor themselves by cultivating a specific identity and persona online. The participants craft an activist persona that engages using ideology-based, factual, and positive posts. Although not altogether negative, natural communication such as reactive posts to issues of the day creates low-level anxiety for activists over looming fear, **not by opposition followers who are predictable but by opaque and unpredictable Facebook algorithm takedowns of their profiles and posts.**

**Two opposition threats emerge. First, from the expected and predictable targeting by opposition followers which activists have longer experience. Second, the new danger of algorithm censorship inevitably fostered in social media platforms severely weakens the campaigns of human rights activists.** The opaque processes of moderating and adjudicating hate speech, controversial posts, and profile takedowns solely with Facebook is highly problematic.

# ACTIVIST THREAT LEVEL PERCEPTION

Active and passive threats occur to social media activists. Bangladeshi activists both post positive but also controversial reactions online. The decision to choose which type of messaging comes with specific risks that they are highly aware of that approaches self-censorship.

This summary presents the perception of passive threats received by activists. They react according to the three levels of risks that they have little control over.

Activist's Threat SELF-ASSESSMENT			
"We activists get attacked on all sides!"			
ONLINE ANNOYANCE	Medium-Risk ONLINE BANS	High-Risk OFFLINE DANGER to Life	LEVELS
"I have a crush on you!"			
Impersonation Unwanted friend requests Circulation of photoshopped Posts & pictures	External Reports Mass Reporting; Fake  Facebook Algorithm Campaigns as Spam Auto Blocks suspicious Profiles; red lists	Offline Conversion Mobilize for violence Death threats Burn house down  FEMALES – SEXUALIZED Threats Graphic videos	Examples

Low-risk threats are online annoyances. They may be low-level threats, but they generate sustained anxiety over continued surveillance daily. These include impersonation of profiles, circulation of photoshopped pictures, and unwanted friend requests. While these have little impact on the page status, these nonetheless create aggravation to daily life.

Medium-risk threats are those that are precursors to profile bans and take downs. There are two types. One is the unknown action undertaken by the Facebook algorithm that red lists profiles, auto blocks profiles, or mark campaigns as spam. The second type is from anonymous followers that mass reports a Facebook profile for take downs.

The high-risk are those threats that shift from the online to the offline real-life of the activist.

Female activists experience highly sexualized threats, including receiving graphic videos, threatening phone calls, and stalking. The most extreme are calls for mobilized violence for both genders that can drive activists to exile themselves abroad.

# ACTIVIST REACTIONS TO OFFLINE THREATS

The different level of threats produces a low level to high levels of anxiety in an activist's daily life. In this section, we discuss the escalating levels of stresses that they experience before undertaking their final decision of exile and third country migration.

One significant impact of online threats is its translation to real-world action. For instance, our partners receive death threats that rollover to their daily lives, such as followers investigating their home addresses, places of work, telephone numbers, and relatives. What follows are stages of reaction that peak when activists are forced to migrate abroad.



high, severe, and sustained. By normalizing it, this has become a significant indicator of danger. The other partners who have experienced sustained harassment, both online and offline limit their movements to their home and places of work or school. Most of them actively engaged with the police state apparatus to seek protection. They assiduously collected screenshots of online harassment as proof of evidence. However, they were duly disappointed that the police system was helpless to address online crime and assist them. Eventually, the police ridiculed their complaints and ignored their problems as not their fault or not substantive enough. Therefore, the course of action was usually after an incident occurs such as the burning of a house; but by that point, the partners were compelled to leave the country in exile for their safety.

However, with one partner, his third country destination has an existing policy of dealing with online harassment. The police allocated him with a security detail at his place of residence. This limited service, in the end, did not make him feel secure. At most, the police are unfamiliar with the online ecosystem, and flatly recommend activists to stay off Facebook as their viable solution.

## Insights

### Takeaways

Threats are directed to the individual and not to the political orientation of the activist despite self-regulation of posts by activists.

Different level of character assassinations occurs for various levels of threats by and through mass reporting from unknown followers.

Another external threat is Facebook itself. Activists attribute high anxiety and helplessness to the unpredictability of Facebook algorithms and opaque negotiation processes when it comes to profile and messaging bans and reversals.

The three types of threats demonstrate the need for personalized and targeted threat assessment. Every activist, depending on their circumstance and geographic location, perceive threats online in different gradients. For our Bangladeshi partners, there are three types.

Low-level threats are provocations that instigate daily anxiety.

Medium-level threats are precursors to a Facebook profile ban.

High-level threats are online threats that cross over to real life that when sustained and escalate may drive the activist to exile.

These threats are fluid and dynamic, and any intervention must be able to shift and respond to these differing categories. However, any warning or notification must also be tailored according to the gradient of threat. Otherwise, activists would normalize and tend to ignore them.

There are two types of external threats that confront activists online. The first category is from known and unknown followers who act on an individual basis or as part of mass reporting groups. These targeted character assassinations range from sexual harassment to creating and circulating fake profiles. The second category is emerging as an unremarked threat against activists - Facebook. Though having community standards on hate speech, activists complain about the unpredictability and unreliability of the algorithms concerning posts and profiles that do not necessarily violate community standards but are nonetheless taken down. The opaque processes within Facebook, such as the possibility of the algorithm "red marking" previously reported violators and unclear process of negotiation, promote frustration and perceptions of unfairness and defeat.

# ACTIVIST ONLINE PREVENTION & REACTION STRATEGIES

Our partners both engage in prevention and reactive strategies to online threats and their Facebook profile bans.

Bangla vs. English		<b>Prevention</b> on Facebook
Fake account est. a Public page		
Friends only posts		
Limiting Audience – political posts public mode Don't read all the comments		
Folders: Colleagues Teachers Red List Black List	Careful with words, no “slang”	

Activists practice a form of self-censorship for various reasons. These include crafting a specific online identity that matches their campaigns and restricting access to their posts such as switching languages and audience definitions as a prevention tactic.

Self-censorship has become a significant prevention tactic because of specific Facebook detection algorithms and its community standards. However, this strategy does not guarantee identity protection or the reduction of profile ban occurrences on Facebook. Activists feel that despite the compromises that they have already made, the opaque and unknown processes of negotiation behind Facebook have made their personal lives and public campaigns unpredictable.

Since activists already feel helpless over the platform, **the study uncovered the importance of their reactive states and processes to counter low to high level threats. It also revealed the significance of the personal touch to seek help.**

Our partners turn to their initial support. These instances include informing them of the event, transferring activities to other media such as a Facebook public page or WhatsApp, and asking friends to tell their other followers of the incident. They also seek help from other tech-savvy or tech-literate friends to assist them on how to go about requesting Facebook to unlock their accounts. The help centre of Facebook is nested within multiple pages and offers minimal explanation. This uncertainty produces anxiety during this period because there is no clear timeline when your account will be unlocked. In some instances, they are given a reset link, but often, you are left waiting which could be anywhere from days, weeks, or months.

<b>Facebook Reactions</b>		<b>REACTIONS</b> After Profile Bans
“Facebook didn’t give me any option of appealing to them. There is no way of contacting them.”		
“Facebook can at anytime personally disable my account. It’s not about Getting banned... it’s my 50,000 people getting lost.”		<b>Freeze Zone</b> Can’t remember password or email
“getting profile back is only possible with friends”		<b>Call a Friend</b>
<b>Relocate Activities to Page</b> “you can make a page, even if you are banned.”		

# CHALLENGE FOR THE HAGUE HACKS – BANGLADESH GROUP

“The human rights network is the *only* place that helps the human rights activists.”

The Hague Hacks is in a significant position in the Netherlands to support activists through its role as a mediator between the worlds of technology and human rights defenders. As a country destination of political refuge, the Bangladesh diaspora community performs a vital role in advocating and supporting the plight of their fellow nationals.

There are two proposed pathways: immediate and long-term solutions developed from the insights from the study. The first requires minimal tech interventions that can deliver rapid solutions.

- project to create reliable, trustworthy information through Wikipedia entries, Wiki-How's
- programme to develop simple YouTube tutorials for basics to unlock Facebook accounts as one example

At the time of the study, there were minimal references on existing tech solutions available on a single site, for both preventive and reactive support. Therefore, a quick impact for HH is to be able to centralize information and become the go-to hub for Facebook updates and news.

For long-term solutions, there are two proposed pathways. **One is the development of a social media-early warning system in which the design offers both pro-active prevention but also the possibility of support during or after a crisis.** The second pathway is the long-term evidence-based lobbying with Facebook using larger sets of data and analysis. This long-term campaign will be executed in cooperation with future academic and research partners.

## RAPID SOLUTIONS MINIMAL TECH

Wikipedia is an underused and under-funded utility that has a wide reach to the greater community with shared values for transparency and fairness. The Hague Hacks can tap this resource with minimal cost and once learned, easily navigate in the future.

Standard searches reveal that Wiki-How's and YouTube offer little information on what to do after a profile takedown. HH can inform and educate on these platforms, at the same time monopolize the brand identity in that sphere. While platform information constantly changes, the production of video for example must remain easy to do and quick to takedown and redo.



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# APPENDIX 1: RESEARCH DESIGN

## Context and Project Overview

The recent Hague Hacks 2018 conference underscored the urgent intervention to help politically engaged SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) actors navigate the challenges of social media use. These online activities include launching political campaigns, personal campaigns, writing political commentary, online harassment, bullying, and being banned online. Initial assessments by the Bangladeshi workgroup show that individual actors require timely information and technical support to keep themselves safe. However, prior to designing the solution, there is a need to understand what kind of information they need, what type of messages are being posted, and who are these politically engaged SAARC actors. This study addresses these knowledge gaps and aims to uncover the behaviour profile and messaging behaviour of these actors.

## General Research Questions:

### Behaviour Profile

1. What are the existing devices that you own, and which one is for home, work, play?
2. What kind of device do you own and mobile phone plan or internet plan if any?
3. How do you characterize your political engagement (choose: one-issue, occasional, active, very active)?
4. How would you label yourself? Are you an activist? What other people do you identify or work with? Can you show me other actors and their networks? How would you describe or label them? Which ones do you identify with?
5. Do you take any active steps in protecting your online identity?
6. What kind of Facebook groups are you part of, what kind of group chats, what kind of pages do you like/follow primarily?
7. What does your news feed look like? What are the main news sources that you follow, whom you follow, i.e., biases that come up, targeted advertisements?
8. Does being outside Bangladesh make issues seem more distant? (How) have your habits changed since you moved? (if you moved)

### Messaging Journey

1. What are your different social media platforms - what topics and purposes apply to which platform?
2. How do you choose the issues? Where do you read them? Then, how do you compose your message?
3. Show me an example of a socially acceptable message. What are the different types of messages that you see, name them. What makes them different from each other?
4. Show me an example of a successful message that you wrote. What made you say it was successful? How different is it from socially acceptable messaging?
5. Show me an example of harassment. What are the differences? What did you do after? Who did you go to for help? What steps or responses did you take? How did you feel? How long was the impact on your day-to-day life?

6. Show me an example of bullying. What are the differences? What did you do after? Who did you go to for help? What steps did you take? How did you feel? How long was the impact on your day-to-day life?
7. Give an example of your posts that have been banned/flagged by Facebook. What steps did you take?

#### Critical Questions on Human Rights

1. Do those who deviate from the “socially acceptable” content constitute a group?
2. Is being banned or flagged as hate speech common practice on Facebook?
3. What role does posting political/ ideological content play in expressing oneself?
4. Are “offline” issues that are controversial translated into online debates and only waged online? Alternatively, are the issues waged both online and offline?
5. What offline changes have resulted from online behaviour (if any)?
6. We also want to find out/ justify why it is so important to counter the bans - What does being banned or being flagged as hate speech make you feel? (if it has happened)

#### Project Outcomes and Insights on the following:

1. Device Ecosystems
2. Messaging Process Flow/Stages
3. Social Media Behaviour Use Flow
4. Implications on Activism

## APPENDIX 2: GDPR & DATA PRIVACY

### Anonymisation of Data during collection

1. Demographic details will be restricted to the provincial level, geographical residence and age range, public figure status, or the number of followers within the text.
2. Instead of a name or initials, a coded number identifier will be used. Any reference card will be stored offline and password protected with only the two project principals having access. Any gender identification marks in the text will not represent the gender marker of the informant.
3. No video will be recorded during the interviews. Any images taken will be restricted to those of social media devices, static online messages, and reference objects necessary for the study.
4. Any audio recording is for purposes of transcription.

### Data Access and Sharing

1. The project principals will have sole access to the collected data. The Hague Peace Projects and its officers will have no access to the primary raw data.
2. No national of a SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) country, former SAARC national, or individuals with ethnic or heritage affiliation to a SAARC culture group or country will have access to any primary raw data. This restriction includes the members of The Bangladeshi Work Group or their working partners, other colleagues, and any project affiliations.
3. The Hague Peace Projects officers and members of the Bangladeshi Work Group and or the Hague Hacks workgroups will only have access with the anonymised meta-analysis of the study, the insights, or during a public presentation.

### Data Storage

1. All analogue and digital data will be stored offline, such as in a locked cabinet or as a password protected folder in an external drive. Any information in the personal computer drive will be transferred to an external drive at the end of processing.
2. All data collected in this first phase will be held indefinitely until the succeeding phases of the next projects are completed. Upon project termination, data collected will be kept for teaching and educational purposes unless otherwise decided upon by the project principals in consultation with the Hague Peace Projects and the Bangladeshi Working Group.
3. All informants have the right to withdraw their participation and request to delete their data at any time. The project principals have 30 days to delete all data from, including information from the meta-analysis, presentations, and identifier reference list, and any other document in which the informant information has been used.

## APPENDIX 3: INFORMED CONSENT FORM

The following is in accordance with regulations by the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR):

I, \_\_\_\_\_, freely agree

- to be interviewed for one session of at least thirty to sixty minutes and at any point may choose to stop and withdraw participation at any time without penalty and explanation
- that I will not receive compensation or any guaranteed benefits from participating in the interview
- to choose how the interview will be recorded:
  - ☐ I consent to audio-recording for purposes of accuracy
  - ☐ I do not consent to audio-recording
  - ☐ I consent to images of social media devices, static online messages, and reference objects necessary for the study
- to choose how the research results will be presented:
  - ☐ I consent to have my anonymised data results to be publicly shared in the following formats: (check the platforms you agree on)
    - ☐ Powerpoint slides format for teaching and education purposes, public presentation in profit and non-profit conferences and platforms
    - ☐ Online publications such as blogs or third-party publication platforms
    - ☐ Academic journal publications
  - ☐ I do not consent to any public presentation of my anonymised data results in any form.
- to choose to receive a summary of the research results at the end of the project
  - ☐ I want to receive the results of the project
  - ☐ I do not want to receive the results of the project
- to choose to request that all my personal details be withdrawn from the project within 30 days and deleted entirely from the project database.

I have read and understood the Informed Consent and conditions of this project. I have had all my questions answered. I hereby acknowledge the above and give my voluntary consent:

\_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Should I have any questions about this research or its conduct, I will contact:

**Alena Kahle**

**Melanie T. Uy**